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Abstract 
 
This literature review examines how cost of capital effects on companies’ willingness to change 
their behavior towards green activity. There have been studies before which have examined green 
companies’ performance compared to polluting entities. Robert Heinkel, Alan Kraus, and Josef 
Zechner, 2001 have found evidence on Journal of financial and quantitative analyses, that people 
will require higher expected return on firms which are polluting. They used different control 
variables which included restrictions: Same amount of companies, no short selling, same cash 
flows, same costs to reform, risk averse investors, Firms maximize share price, 5 percent reforming 
cost from expected cash flow, one period world, unacceptable and reformed firms have same 
common technology, all acceptable firms have different technology compared to unacceptable and 
reformed firms, and returns are normally distributed. Heinkel, Kraus & Zechner, 2001 Stated that 
there has to be first certain number of green investors until it is plausible to change production 
technology. This assumption is based on reforming cost versus cost of capital. In equilibrium cost 
of capital and reforming cost is equal and there are no incentives to reform. There is a strong 
evidence that firms are going to reform when cost of capital increases above certain level and this 
increase is affected on the number of green investors in markets. Higher cost of capital implies 
lower stock price for unreformed companies and therefore they have to make a decision between 
reforming cost and cost of capital. 
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Introduction 
Cost of capital has been long studied factor which contributes on companies’ value. Cost of capital 
is basically a fraction which companies have to pay for having more money. Cost of capital 
constitutes of equity and debt and both fractions are affecting on total amount of cost of capital. 
Required rate of return can be viewed as cost of capital hence they are the same thing. This is 
because other parties require certain return from companies and therefore cost of capital has to be 
equal to required return. Modigliani & Miller, 1958 stated on their book “The cost of capital, 
corporation finance and the theory of investment”, that cost of capital effects on companies’ 
decision making. Also, Ambec & Lanoie, 2008 concluded that cost of capital is motivating 
companies for changing their behavior towards sustainable way.  
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Companies have many functions but one of the most important one is maximizing shareholders 
value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Cost of capital is a function which effects on share price and 
share price is associated to company’s market value. In this sense, corporations should minimize 
their cost of capital and maximize their share value. There is an incentive to change behavior if 
there is a function which can reduce corporate’s cost of capital. This literature review uses same 
assumptions as in a study which was conducted by Robert Heinkel, Alan Kraus & Josef Zechner, 
2001 on Journal of financial and quantitative analyses. There is a certain cost which we can denote 
as K and it effects as barrier for companies to change their technology. We can assume that 
investors are risk averse and they have same risk aversion coefficient. In general, there are two 
types of investors which have green and neutral preferences towards companies. The world exists 
one period and companies make their decision to go green1 in a sense of cost of capital (COC) 
versus reforming cost (K).  
This literature review examines the effect of cost of capital as motivator for companies to change 
their technology. The number of green investors is a variable, which effects on cost of capital and it 
will change corporations’ way to produce goods for consumers. This study examines this 
relationship and concludes if there is evidence that relationship exists between number of green 
investors2 and companies’ willingness to change their production technology.  
 This study goes first trough hypothesis and research question which is then followed by data and 
methodology. After that study concludes with future research suggestions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Green technology is sustainable way to produce products or an improvement from technology which was more 
pollutive before green technology. 
 
2 Green investors are willing to invest in a company which uses technology which is an improvement for previous 
technology or non-pollutive technology used by the company.  
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Hypothesis and research question 
 
Hypothesis of this study is that cost of capital motivates companies to change their technology 
towards sustainable state. There is a certain cost which will restrict companies to change, but if cost 
of capital increases above this cost, companies start to reform their production technologies. There 
is a certain number of green investors in markets. This study assumes that number of green 
investors will increase which will have an effect on polluting companies’ cost of capital.  
 
Can cost of capital motivate companies to change their behaviour towards sustainable production? 
There are many studies which indicate that cost of capital has effect on companies’ motives to 
change their production technology and this thesis examines the magnitude of the effect. Robert 
Heinkel, Alan Kraus & Josef Zechner, 2001, have thorough study related to the topic and their 
findings are supporting hypothesis.  
 
 
 
Data and methodology 
 
This study utilizes Heinkel, Kraus & Zechner used framework3. Assume two type of investors 
which are green investors and neutral investors. They have certain cost K which will have an effect 
on their decision making. All investors have risk-averse preferences and both type of investors 
share same risk tolerance. At first there are same amount of clean and polluting companies. Short 
selling is not allowed because of possible arbitrage opportunity. Both Clean (C) and polluting (P) 
technologies produce same cash flows. Polluting companies have same reforming cost K. Firms in 
markets are trying to maximize their share value. Unreformed (U) and reformed (R) companies 
share same common technology and all acceptable (A) firms for green investors have same 
technology which differs from U and R technologies. Returns are normally distributed in a sense of 
their mean and variance. 
                                                 
3 Equations are from Robert Heinkel, Alan Kraus, and Josef Zechner (Journal of financial and quantitative analyses 
2001). 
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The number of firms can be expressed as follows;  
 
           𝑁 = 𝑁𝐶 + 𝑁𝑃 
 
Expressing acceptable and unacceptable firms for green investors; 
 
𝑁𝐶 = 𝑁𝐴 
          𝑁𝑃 = 𝑁𝑈 + 𝑁𝑅  
 
 
Equilibrium for neutral investors as a utility function; 
 
(1) 
𝑈𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛𝐴𝜇𝐶 + (𝑥𝑛𝑈 + 𝑥𝑛𝑅) 𝜇𝑃 −  
𝑥2𝑛𝐴 𝜎
2
𝐶 + (𝑥𝑛𝑈 +  𝑥𝑛𝑅)
2 𝜎2𝑃 + 2𝑥𝑛𝐴 (𝑥𝑛𝑈 + 𝑥𝑛𝑅) 𝜎𝐶𝑃    
2𝜏
     
− (𝑥𝑛𝐴 − 𝜔𝑛𝐴) 𝑃𝐴 − (𝑥𝑛𝑈 − 𝜔𝑛𝑈 )𝑃𝑈 − (𝑥𝑛𝑅 − 𝜔𝑛𝑅) 𝑃𝑅 
 
 
Equilibrium for green investors as a utility function; 
 
(2) 
𝑈𝑔  =  𝑥𝑔𝐴 𝜇𝐶  + 𝑥𝑔𝑅 𝜇𝑃 − 
𝑥2𝑔𝐴 𝜎
2
𝐶 + 𝑥
2
𝑔𝑅 𝜎
2
𝑃 + 2𝑥𝑔𝐴  𝑥𝑔𝑅 𝜎𝐶𝑃 
2𝜏
− (𝑥𝑔𝐴 − 𝜔𝑔𝐴 ) 𝑃𝐴
− (𝑥𝑔𝑅 − 𝜔𝑔𝑅)𝑃𝑅 
 
Where, 
 
i) 𝑥𝑖𝑘 is the number of shares of firms of category k (k = A, U, R) held by type I investor 
ii) 𝑃𝑘 is the price per share of a firm of category k 
iii) 𝜔𝑖𝑘 is the endowment of shares in firms of category k of a type I investor 
iv) 𝜇𝑘 is produced cash flow in category k 
v) 𝜏 is aggregate risk tolerance for investors 
vi) 𝑃 is the price of share k 
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Optimal portfolio holding for neutral investor comes from taking derivative on 𝑈𝑛 with the respect 
of 𝑥𝑛𝐴 and 𝑥𝑛𝑈  
 
(3) 
 
𝑥𝑛𝐴 𝜎
2
𝐶 + 𝑥𝑛𝑈  𝜎𝐶𝑃 −  𝜏 (𝜇𝐶 − 𝑃𝐴 ) = 0 
 
(4) 
 
𝑥𝑛𝐴 𝜎𝐶𝑃 +  𝑥𝑛𝑈𝜎
2
𝑃  −  𝜏 (𝜇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑈  ) = 0 
 
Solving simultaneously yields a neutral investor’s optimal portfolio holdings, 
 
(5) 
 
𝑥∗𝑛𝐴 =  
𝜏
𝜙
 [(𝜇𝐶 − 𝑃𝐴)𝜎
2
𝑃 − (𝜇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑈  ) 𝜎𝐶𝑃] 
 
(6) 
 
𝑥∗𝑛𝑈 =  
𝜏
𝜙
 [(𝜇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑈)𝜎
2
𝐶 − (𝜇𝐶 − 𝑃𝐴 ) 𝜎𝐶𝑃] 
 
Where 𝜙 =  𝜎2𝐶𝜎
2
𝑃 −  𝜎
2
𝐶𝑃 
 
 
 
First order conditions for green investors; 
 
(7) 
 
𝑥𝑔𝐴𝜎
2
𝐶 + 𝑥𝑔𝑅𝜎𝐶𝑃 −  𝜏(𝜇𝐶 − 𝑃𝐴) 
 
(8) 
 
𝑥𝑔𝐴𝜎𝐶𝑃 + 𝑥𝑔𝑅𝜎
2
𝑃 −  𝜏(𝜇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑅) 
 
 
Solving simultaneously yields a green investor’s optimal portfolio holdings; 
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(9) 
 
𝑥∗𝑔𝐴 =  
𝜏
𝜙
 [(𝜇𝐶 − 𝑃𝐴)𝜎
2
𝑃 − (𝜇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑅 ) 𝜎𝐶𝑃] 
 
(10) 
 
𝑥∗𝑔𝑅 =  
𝜏
𝜙
 [(𝜇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑅)𝜎
2
𝐶 − (𝜇𝐶 − 𝑃𝐴 ) 𝜎𝐶𝑃] 
 
Equilibrium share prices with market clearing conditions; 
 
(11) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑥
∗
𝑛𝐴 + 𝐼𝑔𝑥
∗
𝑔𝐴 =  𝑁𝐴 =  𝑁𝐶  
 
 
(12) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑥
∗
𝑛𝑈 =  𝑁𝑈 
 
(13) 
 
𝐼𝑔𝑥
∗
𝑔𝑅 =  𝑁𝑅 
 
Resulting equilibrium prices are; 
 
(14) 
 
𝑃𝐴 =  𝜇𝐶 −  
1
𝐼𝜏
 [𝑁𝐶𝜎
2
𝐶 + 𝑁𝑃𝜎𝐶𝑃] 
 
(15) 
 
𝑃𝑈 =  𝜇𝑃 − 
1
𝐼𝜏
[𝑁𝐶𝜎𝐶𝑃 + 𝑁𝑈𝜎
2
𝑃 + 𝑁𝑈
𝐼𝑔
𝐼𝑛
𝜙
𝜎2𝐶
+ 𝑁𝑅
𝜎2𝐶𝑃
𝜎2𝐶
] 
 
(16) 
 
𝑃𝑅 =  𝜇𝑃 − 
1
𝐼𝜏
 [𝑁𝐶𝜎𝐶𝑃 + 𝑁𝑈
𝜎2𝐶𝑃
𝜎2𝐶
+ 𝑁𝑅𝜎
2
𝑃 + 𝑁𝑅
𝐼𝑛
𝐼𝑔
𝜙
𝜎2𝐶
] 
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Number of unacceptable firms that pays to become acceptable equals the price of unacceptable 
firms plus reforming cost K; 
 
𝑃𝑅 =  𝑃𝑈 + 𝐾 
 
 
Optimal corporate acceptability choice solving for 𝑁𝑅  yields; 
 
(17) 
𝑁𝑅 = max {0,
𝐼𝑔
𝐼
 (𝑁 − 𝑁𝐶 − 𝐾𝐼𝑛𝜏
𝜎2𝐶
𝜙
)} 
 
𝑁𝑅  comes positive in equation (17) when; 
 
(18) 
 
𝐼∗𝑔 ∶  𝑁𝑅 > 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑔 >  𝐼
∗
𝑔 
 
Substituting 𝑁𝑅  from Equation (17) into expression 𝑃𝑅 yields; 
 
(19) 
𝑃𝑅 =  𝜇𝑃 − 
1
𝐼𝜏
 [𝑁𝐶𝜎𝐶𝑃 + (𝑁 − 𝑁𝐶)𝜎
2
𝑃 − 𝐾𝐼𝑛𝜏]  
 
This helps examine how reformed firm cost of capital changes compared to parameter values. 
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Results 
 
Results are from the model of Heinkel, Kraus, & Zechner, 2001. This study has used different 
parameter values than in the original study. Parameter values are presented on the following table: 
 
Assumptions Value
Mean cash flows 100
Average standard deviation of cash flows 10
Portfolio variance CP 20
Covariance of Cash Flows 50
Reforming Cost 0,5
Total Number of Investors 1
Total Number of Firms 1
Number of Firms with Each Technology 0,5
Investors aggregate risk tolerance 100
Acceptable firm's number of shares 0,3
Unacceptable firm's number of shares 0,5
Reformed firms's number of shares 0,2
Acceptable firm's endowment rate 0
Unacceptable firm's endowment rate 0,2
Reformed firms's endowment rate 0,01  
Figure 1.1 Values from figure are used in formulas (14) and (15).  
 
There is evidence based on the model of Heinkel, Kraus & Zechner, 2001, that cost of capital can 
change when markets will have enough green investors participating. They will make pressure on 
polluting firms for changing their technology in a sense of decreasing their cost of capital. In a real 
world, companies can have different reforming costs and that will have an effect on the result. 
There is also an evidence that companies can increase their productivity when they change their 
production technology (Wubben, 2000). There is evidence that when companies go green they can 
sell their technology to other companies (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008). Study also indicates that barriers 
to enter on new markets decreases, when their production technology is sustainable (Ambec & 
Lanoie, 2008). Model which is used on this study ignores these aspects.  
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Figure 1.2 Shows how polluting firms share price is declining when amount of green investors increases. Formula’s 
used on calculations are (14), (15). 
 
Figure above illustrates the effect when green investors enter the markets and start to effect on 
polluting firms cost of capital. Polluting firms share price goes down when green investors demand 
higher required return on polluting firms. This will decline the share value of polluting firms and 
increasing the number of reformed firms on markets.  
 
Proportion of green investors Value K 0,3 Value K 0,5 Value K 0,8 Value K 1
0,1 99,32 99,5 99,77 99,95
0,2 99,29 99,45 99,69 99,85
0,3 99,26 99,4 99,61 99,75
0,4 99,23 99,35 99,53 99,65
0,5 99,2 99,3 99,45 99,55
0,6 99,17 99,25 99,37 99,45
0,7 99,14 99,2 99,29 99,35
0,8 99,11 99,15 99,21 99,25
0,9 99,08 99,1 99,13 99,15
1 99,05 99,05 99,05 99,05  
Figure 1.3 illustrates share value sensitivity for reformed firms depended of reforming cost K. Formula used on 
calculations is formula (19).  
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Table above shows how reforming cost effects on reformed companies share value. When K is 
going higher share value of reformed companies is also higher, when amount of green investors is 
small. This is because, when K is high, companies do not want to reform until cost of capital is 
equal to K and it is reasonable to change their production technology. Reformed firms have same 
technology as unwanted firms and therefore the share price of unreformed firms is cost of capital + 
K compared to reformed firms which share price is simply affected on their cost of capital (Heinkel, 
Kraus & Zechner, 2001) 
 
Proportion of green investors Risk aversion 25 Risk aversion 50 Risk aversion 100 Risk aversion 200
0,1 99,1625 99,275 99,5 99,95
0,2 99,15 99,25 99,45 99,85
0,3 99,1375 99,225 99,4 99,75
0,4 99,125 99,2 99,35 99,65
0,5 99,1125 99,175 99,3 99,55
0,6 99,1 99,15 99,25 99,45
0,7 99,0875 99,125 99,2 99,35
0,8 99,075 99,1 99,15 99,25
0,9 99,0625 99,075 99,1 99,15
1 99,05 99,05 99,05 99,05  
Figure 1.4 Shows how risk aversion effects on reformed firms share price. Formula used on calculations is formula 
(19). 
 
Table above shows how in different risk aversion levels reformed firms share price is affected on a 
function to proportion of green investors. Green investors are willing to lower their required return 
when their risk aversion coefficient increases, because they can diversify more efficiently on 
different companies. This explains why reformed companies share price is higher when risk 
aversion coefficient is high. At the end when there are 100 percent green investors in market, share 
price is same regardless of risk aversion coefficient. This is because all firms have reformed, and 
they cannot get lower expected returns compared to other firms, because the model assumes same 
cash flows and same production technology. Higher risk aversion on green investors motivates 
companies to change their production technology because they will get lower cost of capital doing 
so.  
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Ig (Risk aversion 0,5) 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 %
U(n) 28,3 33,2 36,1 37,0 36,0 33,0 28,1 21,2 12,3 1,4
U(g) 20,2 30,3 40,3 50,3 60,3 70,3 80,3 90,3 100,3 110,3
Total U 48,5 63,4 76,3 87,3 96,3 103,3 108,4 111,5 112,6 111,7  
Figure 1.5 illustrates the relationship of the amount of green investors on market and its effect on utilities of green and 
neutral investors. Formulas used in calculations (1) and (2). 
 
Figure above shows how green investor utility raises approximately one unit per percentage of 
green investors on market. Total utility is maximized when there are 90 percent of green investors 
and 10 percent of neutral investors. This is a naïve approximation, but it illustrates the framework 
of how proportion of green investors can have an effect on total utility on markets. Total utility can 
have an effect on cost of capital because investors wants to maximize their total utility and choose 
their portfolio which maximizes their level of utility.  
 
It is interesting to consider what is optimal number of green investors and neutral investors on 
markets. Real number of optimal amount of green investors is dependable of risk aversion 
coefficient 𝜏, reforming cost K, cash flows of polluting and green firms, covariance’s between 
green and polluting firms cash flows and their endowment rate. There are many variables which are 
affecting on optimal level and therefore it is impossible to say which is the optimal amount of green 
investors which maximize investors’ total utility. 
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Utilities in different proportions of green investors with risk 
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Conclusion & future research 
 
Through careful review results indicate that cost of capital can act as a motivator for companies to 
change their production technology towards sustainable way. Companies want to adjust their cost of 
capital in a lower level, if costs for reform are not too high. In the model of Heinkel, Kraus & 
Zechner, 2001, which shows in equilibrium that when all companies have reformed which have 
equal or higher cost of capital compared to K, there is no pressure to reform anymore. There is 
fixed amount of acceptable and unacceptable firms on markets. In a real world K is different for 
companies and it can vary trough time. This could lead to a point, where all companies eventually 
become acceptable and polluting companies disappear. The model assumes that reformed 
companies sustain unacceptable technology and pays premium K to become acceptable. The other 
option could be that they pay certain amount K and change their technology same as green 
companies. This would resemble better for reality in sense of acceptability of companies for green 
investors portfolio. Also, information can have an effect on green companies’ stock price. David 
Lesley & Maureen O’hara, 2004, states that information asymmetries can lead on different share 
prices and informed investors can utilize this information on their favor. This could lead under 
allocation of green companies, if information on markets is too restricted and neutral investors 
cannot utilize this information. The number of green investors is increasing on markets and Morgan 
Stanley found on their research in 2017 that 75 percent of investors in U.S are interested in 
sustainable investing and 71 percent of U.S investors are believing that sustainability practices are 
better in long term investments. These findings indicate that markets are going through changes and 
firms are starting to reform because there are investors who demand sustainability from companies 
which they choose to invest in.  
 
In future research there is plenty options to continue. There have been studies which have examined 
on abstract level of changes in corporate behaviour and their motives to change their technology. 
The correlation between successful companies and sustainability has been unclear. Is it because 
wealthy companies can afford their reforming or is it because they have pressure from outside to 
change and therefore they have to adjust their behaviour towards green economy? This also leads to 
another question; are green companies successful because they have changed their technology or is 
it because they are already market leaders, and therefore they could do well, regardless of green 
technology. These questions need more studies to conduct and future research could reveal 
interesting results.  
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